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  1Abstract 
This paper analyzes the determinants of disclosure level in the accounting for financial 
instruments of Portuguese listed companies. We have constructed an index of disclosure 
based on IAS 32 and 39 disclosure requirements and computed the index score for each 
company.  Consequently, this study also analyzes the characteristics of companies that are 
closest to IAS before 2005. The analysis includes variables that capture intrinsic features of 
Portuguese companies and institutional regulatory context, such as capital structure and 
characteristics of the corporate governance structure, within contingency theory. We could not 
find significant influence of corporate governance structure and of financing structure. We 
conclude that disclosure degree is significantly related to size, type of auditor, listing status 
and to the economic sector. This research reveals areas for improvement of the Portuguese 
companies’ reporting practices and suggests areas for intervention of the Portuguese capital 
markets regulator in the context of mandatory IAS after 2005. 
 
JEL Code: M41 Accounting 
Key words: Financial instruments accounting, Disclosure indices, Firm-specific 





  2I. INTRODUCTION 
This research analyzes the determinants of disclosure practices in the accounting for financial 
instruments by Portuguese listed companies. Considering the mandatory adoption of 
International Accounting Standards after 2005 by listed companies, our ultimate objective is 
to analyze the characteristics of companies that are closest to the disclosure requirements of 
the International Accounting Standards (IAS)
1 related to financial instruments – IAS 32 and 
IAS 39. 
There are several theories that help us to develop hypotheses on the determinants of 
accounting practices: the positive accounting theory (Leftwich et al. (1981) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978)), the signalling theory (Ross (1977)), and legitimacy and institutional 
theory. These theories have been the background of several accounting studies on 
determinants of accounting choice and disclosure in a wide range of countries. This paper is 
based on the idea that those theories, originated in developed capital markets, may not apply 
fully explain accounting and disclosure practices in Portugal, where there is a quite large 
degree of family ownership and bank-oriented financing policies. Therefore, we include in the 
analysis variables that capture intrinsic features of Portuguese companies context, such as 
capital structure and characteristics of the corporate governance structure, within other 
theoretical frameworks, namely, contingency theory. 
Our main research questions are then: 
Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to the Portuguese listed 
companies? 
What are the factors that most influence disclosure practices in Portuguese companies? 
What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents previous literature 
related to the determinants of disclosure and compliance. Section III provides a brief 
regulatory background. Section IV describes the development of the hypotheses. In Section 
V, the research design is explained, which includes a description of the dependent and the 
independent variables, the sample selection process and the sample characteristics. Section VI 
gives the main statistical results while Section VII discusses the research results and draws 
some conclusions.  
                                                 
1 In this paper, IAS stands for all the standards issued by IASB including International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). 
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II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Healy and Palepu (2001) describe the theoretical background to the demand for disclosure 
(agency conflicts and information asymmetry) and review the empirical disclosure literature. 
They divide it into four categories: the role of disclosure regulation in reducing information 
and agency problems; the effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries; factors 
affecting decisions by managers on financial reporting and disclosures; and the economic 
consequences of disclosures. The most relevant category to our study is the one that tries to 
explain managers’ decisions, which has two main areas: (1) focusing on managers’ 
accounting decisions based on the positive theory of accounting and (2) focusing on 
management disclosure decisions (voluntary disclosure literature, which is complementary to 
the first one). 
Accounting research on the determinants of disclosure practices and other accounting choices 
based on company’s characteristics is a very extensive field. In this literature review, we 
concentrate on studies that address IAS adoption or financial instruments accounting
2. We 
divide these studies in two types which differ between each other in the way that the adoption 
of the standards (dependent variable) is measured. In one group of studies, the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the company claims to adopt IAS and 
the value 0, otherwise. This type of studies does not take into account the fact that some 
companies claim to comply with IAS but in fact fail to comply with many IAS requirements 
(Cairns (1998), Cairns (1999)). As a consequence, it began to appear another type of studies 
that quantifies the extent of compliance with a single (or a group of) standard(s) using 
disclosure indices. This second type of studies examines annual reports of companies that 
claim to comply with IAS in order to quantify actually the degree of compliance. This paper 
                                                 
2 There are several other studies that, in spite of having addressed the determinants of disclosure in general (not 
specifically related to IAS or financial instruments), bring insights to our research regarding the choice and 
measurement of explicative and dependent variables. We refer to some recent studies: Chen and Jaggi (2000)– 
Hong Kong; Eng and Mak (2003) - Singapore; Cooke (1989)- Sweden, Cooke (1993)- Japan; Hossain et al. 
(1994) – Malaysia; Wallace et al. (1994)– Spain; Wallace and Naser (1995)– Hong Kong; Gibbins et al. (1990); 
Frost and Pownall (1994); Gray et al. (1995)– US and UK; Meek and Roberts (1995)– US, UK and Continental 
Europe; Inchausti (1997) – Spain; Raffournier (1995) – Switzerland; Watson et al. (2002) – UK; Tai et al. 
(1990) – Hong Kong; Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); Akhtaruddin (2005) – Bangladesh; Ali et al. (2004) – South 
Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) paper is a very extensive literature review, which 
includes several early accounting studies on the determinants (company’s characteristics) of disclosure. It gives a 
thorough description of each study with respect to sample country, companies and time period, dependent 
variable(s), independent variables and results. 
  4is included into this second group of studies, once we develop a disclosure index based on the 
requirements of IAS 32 and IAS 39.  
The first group of studies includes Tarca (2004), Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), Ashbaugh 
(2001), Murphy (1999), El-Gazzar et al. (1999) and Dumontier and Raffournier (1998). The 
second group includes Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Street and 
Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Tower et al. 
(1999).  
 
Table 1 summarizes these studies, showing the type of statistical analysis conducted, the 
explanatory variables adopted and the empirical results. 
  5Table 1: Recent empirical studies on the determinants of accounting choices based on firm’s characteristics 
  Dependent variable 
  Disclosure indices  Dummy variable (adopter/non-adopter) 









































Univ/ Multiv  Multiv 
(logistic 
regression) 
Explanatory variables                                    
Size  +  0      0 0 0  +     0     +  + 
Industry  Y     Y/0 Y  0  0 0              0 
Auditor type  Y/0 Y  Y/0  Y               0     Y/0    
Listing status     Y Y/0  Y  Y     Y +     + Y Y 
Multinationality           0        Y     + +  +  + 
Profitability        0  0 0 0              0    
Relationship 
shareholders/  creditors 
(leverage, gearing, DE) 






0/+     Y/0           0 +  0     + 
  
Capital intensity                                0/-    




Y                               
  
Analysts following  +                                  
Length of time to report                 -                   
Notes: Y statistically significant relationship; + positive relationship; - negative relationship; 0 no relationship
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III. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
In this section we describe briefly financial instruments accounting rules in Portugal, 
highlighting the main differences relative to IAS 32 and IAS 39
3.   
Regarding measurement criteria in non-financial companies, on-balance sheet financial 
instruments should be measured at cost (or market value, if it is lower). Future contracts used 
in trading operations are measured at fair value. The other off-balance sheet financial 
instruments are not covered by specific accounting rules. This gap is covered by Accounting 
Directive 18 (CNC (1996)), which establishes compliance with IAS whenever Portuguese 
standards are not available. So, it may be expected that companies are already adopting some 
IAS requirements in their accounting for financial instruments. 
In financial companies, fair value should be applied to trading securities and to FRAs, futures, 
options and swaps when used in trading operations. Changes in the fair value should be 
registered in profits and losses in the period in which they occur. For operations that qualify 
for hedge accounting, the profits and losses of the hedging instruments and the hedged 
instruments are registered simultaneously, and the measurement criterion of the hedged 
position prevails. Regarding disclosure, the list of requirements is already quite demanding, 
particularly regarding derivatives adoption. 
 
IV. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Given the Portuguese regulatory background described above, and bearing in mind that the 
European Union has been stating its goal of accounting harmonization within the member 
states since 2000 (through the proposal of Regulation
4 requiring all listed companies to 
prepare their consolidated financial statements based on IAS), it is interesting to analyze 
which companies were already anticipating IAS requirements especially with respect to 
financial instruments’ disclosure items. The adoption of IAS means an increase in disclosure 
requirements. Consequently, the theoretical background is provided by disclosure theories. 
Verrecchia (2001) extensively reviews and categorises theoretical accounting literature on 
                                                 
3 We have followed the 2000 versions of IAS 32 and IAS 39 because these were the versions operating for 
financial statements in 2001 (the year of our empirical study). 
4 Regulation 1606/2002. 
  7disclosure in order to develop a theory of disclosure by companies. He concludes that 
asymmetry reduction is one potential starting point for a comprehensive theory of disclosure. 
It has been shown empirically that disclosure is a complex function of several factors: it 
depends on both company-specific factors (internal factors), and external factors, related to 
the environmental context of the company, which include, culture, legal system, institutional 
background, among others. There are several theories that explain disclosure practices by 
companies: agency and political costs theories (Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990)), signalling theory (Ross (1977), Morris (1987)), legitimacy and 
institutional theory (Guthrie and Parker (1990), Carpenter and Feroz (1992), Carpenter and 
Feroz (2001), Mezias (1990)),  proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), 
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and Wagenhofer (1990)) and contingency theory (Gray 
(1988), Fechner and Kilgore (1994), Doupnik and Salter (1995)).  
The argument for this paper is that the agency, the political costs and the signalling theories, 
widely applied to developed capital markets, may not fully explain accounting and disclosure 
practices in Portugal where there is high concentration of capital in families and bank-
oriented financing policies.  
Nobes (1998) describes a model of international differences in financial reporting based on 
the different purposes of reporting in each country. The purpose of financial reporting is 
determined by the financial system of the country. Disclosure items are determined by the 
relative importance of outsiders (financers who do not belong to the board of directors, 
including individual shareholders) compared with insiders (financers such as governments, 
families and banks). In countries where outsiders are important, there is a demand for more 
disclosure. Models that incorporate cultural and other environmental factors have been 
empirically tested by several researchers in either multi-country studies (Zarzeski (1996), 
Hussein (1996), Jaggi and Low (2000), Salter (1998), Williams (2004), Archambault and 
Archambault (2003)) or single-country studies (Chen and Jaggi (2000), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Akhtaruddin (2005)). Chen and Jaggi (2000) study the influence of specific corporate 
governance factors present in East Asian companies (proportion of independent directors in 
the corporate board and family ownership) on disclosures comprehensiveness by companies. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) include in their study corporate governance, cultural and company-
specific factors as determinants of disclosure, arguing that (p. 317) “disclosure practice does 
not develop in a vacuum, but rather reflects the underlying environmental influences that 
affect managers and companies in different countries.”. 
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The hypotheses and the independent variables 
Based on the theoretical considerations and on the previous empirical research described 
above, we have developed several hypotheses that relate company-specific characteristics to 
disclosure practices in Portugal. All hypotheses are stated in alternative form indicating the 
expected sign of the relationship. 
Size 
There are several arguments that can be used to link size to disclosure. As Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) argue, political costs are higher in larger companies. Consequently, larger 
companies are more likely to show higher levels of disclosure since it improves confidence 
and reduces political costs. Secondly, larger companies are supposed to have superior 
information systems. Consequently, additional disclosure is supposedly less costly in larger 
companies than in smaller ones. Moreover, proprietary costs related to competitive 
disadvantages of additional disclosure (Verrecchia (1983)) are smaller as company size 
increases.  
H1: Larger companies are expected to have higher levels of disclosure than smaller 
companies 
Industry 
The relationship between industry and disclosure can be explained by the political costs 
theory. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that industry membership (being related to size) 
is related to political costs. Proprietary costs also vary according to industry. 
Additionally, companies in the same industry have interests in producing the same level of 
disclosure as other companies in the same industry in order to avoid being negatively 
appreciated by the market (competitive pressures). This argument is in line with the signalling 
theory. 
Legitimacy and institutional theory also support this hypothesis because some industries have 
higher institutional pressures than others. 
 
  9These theoretical considerations do not define the direction of the relationship between 
disclosure and industry clearly. Therefore, our hypothesis does not indicate an expected sign 
for the relation. 
H2: Disclosure practices are predicted to be related to the industry in which the 
company operates 
Auditor Type 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) argue that to maintain their reputation and avoid reputation 
costs, high profile auditing companies are more likely to demand high levels of disclosure of 
their clients. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) observe that, in their own interest and for the 
sake of their reputation, auditors want their clients to comply with complex accounting 
standards. 
This is also linked to the fact that major international auditing companies have greater 
knowledge about IAS and so the costs of implementing and auditing them in their clients is 
lower than for smaller auditing companies. 
Auditing is argued to be a way of reducing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983)) and so companies that have high agency costs tend to contract 
high quality auditing companies. 
H3: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies audited by the Big 5 
auditors than in companies with non-Big 5 auditors 
Listing Status 
The relationship between the company listing status and disclosure practices is based on the 
agency cost and the signalling arguments. Companies listed on multiple or foreign stock 
exchanges have greater agency problems. Higher disclosure reduces shareholders’ monitoring 
costs. Additionally, in general, foreign investors are unfamiliar with national standards and so 
internationally listed companies tend to comply with international standards so that their 
accounts are understood by the majority of potential investors
5.  
 Companies expect that compliance with IAS and high disclosure levels are interpreted as 
good signals by the market and so could be a means of obtaining cheaper capital. This 
                                                 
5 Many stock exchanges around the world allow foreign companies to prepare their financial statements 
according to IAS (see IASB site). 
  10argument is even stronger if the company wants to raise its capital in foreign markets (capital-
need hypothesis, Cooke (1989)). 
 
H4: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies listed on foreign 
exchanges than in companies listed on only one (its national) stock exchange 
Multinationality 
This hypothesis is linked to the last one. The more internationalised a company is the more it 
has to show its stakeholders (customers, suppliers, government) that it is a good company. 
Even a company that is not listed internationally may have an interest in showing good levels 
of disclosure if it has international operations. 
Cooke (1989) also argues that companies operating in more than one geographical area tend 
to have better managerial control systems because of the greater complexity of their 
operations. Better and more sophisticated management control and reporting systems produce 
an amount of additional information which can be easily disclosed without additional costs of 
preparation. So, they are expected to have higher levels of disclosure. 




As higher leverage levels suggest higher agency costs (potential wealth transfers from 
debtholders to shareholders and managers), compliance with IAS and good disclosure levels 
can be used to reduce agency costs and information asymmetries. There are authors, however, 
that support a negative relation between leverage and disclosure (Zarzeski (1996), Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman (2003)). The argument is based on signalling factors and relies on the 
fact that companies with high leverage ratios belong to bank-oriented financial systems where 
capital markets are not seen as a primary capital source, and information about companies is 
more private than public. This argument, however, does not take into account public debt. 
These arguments show the inability of leverage alone to be a good proxy for the capital 
structure of a company in terms of its relation to disclosure degree, because, in fact debt may 
be inside debt or outside debt. Tarca et al. (2005), based on Nobes (1998), argue that 
companies with relatively more outsider debt are more likely to use IAS. They defined 
  11outsider debt as the amount of long term debt that is sourced from the public capital market. 
Based on theoretical considerations and on previous empirical studies, we argue that the 
degree of disclosure is related to leverage, without specifying a direction for the relationship. 
 
H6: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be related to leverage 
Importance of shareholders 
The greater the importance of equity the greater the information needs of shareholders and the 
monitoring costs. The argument is the same as the one for the agency costs reduction, given 
above. However, there is the same problem regarding outside versus inside equity. In fact, 
equity may be inside in which case, shareholders have access to inside information meaning 
that disclosure is less important. Tarca et al. (2005) defines outside equity as the proportion of 
equity held by outsiders to the company, determined based on information about shareholder 
structure. Based on the theoretical considerations and on previous empirical studies, we argue 
that: 




In order to complement the importance of inside finance versus outside finance, we introduce 
in the analysis another aspect of the companies’ management which may determine disclosure 
level. Both agency and contingency theories conduct us to think that corporate governance 
structure of the company may be related to reporting practices, specifically to disclosure 
practices. The premise of agency theory is that independent directors are needed on the boards 
to monitor and control the actions of the other executive managers (Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002)). So, board composition may be an interesting variable to consider because it will 
reflect the role of independent directors. It can be expected more disclosure for companies 
with higher proportion of independent directors, once they are outside to the company and 
will force management to disclose. On the other hand, if the board has a high proportion of 
non-independent directors, it can be expected less disclosure, once they have access to inside 
information. Portuguese companies are widely seen as being family managed with scarce 
separation between those who own and those who manage capital and as a consequence 
  12turned on to inside or major stakeholders (the families or the main capital, either debt or 
equity, providers). As such, if the board includes representatives of shareholders, these capital 
owners do not have to rely extensively on public disclosure since they have access to internal 
information. 
 
H8: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher the greater the proportion of 
independent directors on the board 
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study has three main broad research questions: 
Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to the Portuguese listed 
companies? 
Which factors most influence disclosure practices in Portuguese companies? 
What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies? 
Based on these broad questions, our immediate research goals are: 
-  to identify the most important factors associated with the level of financial instruments 
disclosures and, 
-  to identify the characteristics of companies that are closest to IAS 32 and IAS 39 
requirements. 
Next, we describe how we constructed and measured the dependent variable, the proxies for 
the independent variables, the sample collecting process and the sample’s main 
characteristics. 
The dependent variable 
Aiming at identifying disclosure practices concerning financial instruments, we applied the 
content analysis technique to listed companies’ annual reports, which were comprehensively 
analyzed. This analysis is based on a list of categories that covered all the items that assist us 
to identify the existence and content of disclosures required by IAS 32 and IAS 39. 
  13Based on the list of categories used in the content analysis of annual reports, we constructed a 
disclosure index. This index has eleven main categories of information, which are then 
subdivided into 54 items. The main categories are designated as follows: 
(1) Accounting policies (7 items)  
(2) Fair values and market values (9 items) 
(3) Securitisation and repurchase agreements (5 items) 
(4) Derivatives: Accounting policies (5 items) 
(5) Derivatives: Risks (4 items) 
(6) Derivatives: Hedging (10 items) 
(7) Derivatives: Fair value (4 items) 
(8) Interest rate risk (2 items) 
(9) Credit risk (3 items) 
(10) Collateral (2 items) 
(11) Other (3 items) 
The detailed components of this index are described in Appendix I. 
The construction of the index followed the literature on related areas. The index has three 
main characteristics. It is (1) dichotomous, (2) unweighted, and (3) adjusted for non-
applicable items. These characteristics are now analyzed more carefully and our choices 
considered, based on the literature. 
  
Dichotomous 
A score of one is assigned to an item if it is disclosed (disclosure index) and a score of zero 
otherwise. 









where di is 1 if item i is disclosed and 0 otherwise; m is the maximum number of items (54). 
 
  14Unweighted 
The total score is calculated as the unweighted sum of the score in each item. The implied 
assumption is that each item is equally important for all user groups. We are conscious that 
this assumption may not reflect reality, but we think that the resulting bias is smaller than the 
one that would result from attributing subjective weights to each item. The majority of 
disclosure studies adopts unweighted indices: Cooke (1989), Cooke (1993), Meek and 
Roberts (1995), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). 
Several disclosure literature supports unweighted indices. Robbins and Austin (1986)
 found 
that (p. 412-413) “the independent variables which were significantly associated with the 
simple index of disclosure (consists only of the extent of disclosure) quality were also 
significantly associated with the compound index (the product of the extent and relative 
importance of financial disclosure index)”. Spero (1979), as cited by Hodgdon (2004), argues 
that attaching weights to disclosure items is irrelevant because companies that tend to be more 
forthcoming with less important information also tend to be more forthcoming with more 
important information. Firth (1980) and Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) found the same results 
for weighted and unweighted indices.  
 
Adjusted for non-applicable items 
In assigning the score for each item, the applicability of the item to each company was taken 
into account. That is, we considered that a company should not be penalized if an item is not 
relevant. This procedure observed maximum caution
6. We read the entire annual report and if 
there is no mention of a specific item, we assume that it was not relevant. So a maximum 









where di is the disclosure item, and n is the number of items applicable to that company (n is 
smaller than 54). 
                                                 
6 We are aware of the subjectivity that can be introduced by this procedure.  Regarding the type of instruments 
and transactions, which are quite new and unknown for some of the sample companies, we believe that by not 
adjusting for non-applicable items we would introduce a bigger result bias. This situation is the opposite of what 
we find on Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). There, companies not using derivatives and making no disclosure 
were considered as non-disclosing companies. The reason is that it is assumed that the majority of companies 
would be using derivative instruments based on a previous survey. 
  15Then an adjusted index is calculated as T/M. This adjustment procedure for non-applicable 
items is found in most of the empirical studies reviewed (Cooke (1989), Cooke (1993), Meek 
and Roberts (1995), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997)). 
 
The Independent Variables 
According to our hypotheses, the determinants of disclosure to be tested are size, industry, 
auditor type, listing status, multinationality, capital structure and corporate governance 
characteristics.  
Size can be measured in several different ways. We consider two measures of size: total assets 
(Tassets) and sales (Tsales), measured in million euros. These measures of size are frequently 
used in many studies.  
From prior research and theoretical considerations, there is no consistent approach to 
subdivide the companies by industry. According to the expectation from accounting 
regulation, we adopt the classification that separates companies between finance and non-
finance companies using a dummy variable (ind1). 
Auditor type is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is audited by a Big 5 
company and 0 otherwise. In 2001, the Big five auditors were Arthur Andersen, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
Listing status is another dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the company is listed in 
the country of origin stock exchange and 0 otherwise. That is, for a company that is listed or 
cross-listed in foreign stock exchanges this variable takes the value 0. 
The degree of multinationality is measured by the percentage of foreign sales (foreign sales 
divided by total sales).  
Regarding capital structure, we identified, a priori, three relevant variables: leverage, 
importance of equity and ownership diffusion.  The degree of leverage is measured by the 
debt to equity ratio. Considering the problem that debt can be outside or inside, meaning that 
the premises of agency theory would lead to more disclosure in case of public debt, it would 
be important to distinguish between inside and outside debt (Tarca et al. (2005)). 
Unfortunately, we were unable to distinguish between public and private debt based on 
information disclosed by companies, meaning that in order to make this differentiation we 
  16would have to exclude a big number of observations from our already small number of 
companies.  
The importance of equity is measured by the ratio market value to total assets. Equity 
investors are usually outsiders to a company. But this is not always true, especially in 
Portugal which is seen as a country where companies, even public companies, are family 
owned and the capital is concentrated in a small number of shareholders. If a shareholder 
owns a large stake in a company, the dependence on public disclosure is likely to be smaller, 
because he can directly monitor management. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse stock 
concentration ownership especially in the context of the Portuguese companies. The article 
448º of Commercial Law (Código das Sociedades Comerciais) obliges companies to disclose 
the name of the shareholders that hold more than 1/10, 1/3 and 1/2 of the capital. The article 
6º of Regulation nº 11/2000 (CMVM (2000)), revised by Regulation nº 4/2004 (CMVM 
(2004)), of the Portuguese securities market regulator (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários) obliges the disclosure of the qualified holdings (5%, 10% or 20% of the 
capital as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code). This means that even if companies 
disclosed both information as it is required by law, it is not possible to construct a variable 
coherent for every company such as the proportion of shares owned by the five largest 
shareholders or percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders just because companies 
only disclose some of their shareholders. What we can get is the top two or three or five or 
other number of shareholders, and in some cases nothing is disclosed. We tried to overcome 
this problem, asking for this information to the Portuguese stock exchange (Euronext Lisbon), 
which sent us a database for the year 2000 (the latest year for which they collected this 
information). We could use the information for the year 2000, in spite all other data are for 
2001, with the bias known a priori that would be introduced, but still this database revealed to 
be very incomplete and did not have the five biggest shareholders for all quoted companies
7. 
In order to include this variable in the econometric analysis, several observations would have 
to be deleted due to lack of information on the variable. This procedure would bring many 
problems once it would reduce considerably the sample size introducing problems to 
hypothesis testing. Consequently, although the perceived importance of this variable mainly 
among Portuguese companies, we decided not to include this variable on the econometric 
analysis. Nevertheless, a descriptive analysis of the ownership diffusion of Portuguese 
                                                 
7 Among the 55 quoted companies, this database allows us to obtain the top five shareholders for 27 companies, 
the top four shareholders for 7 companies, the top three shareholders for 6 companies and the top two 
shareholders for ten companies. 
  17companies based on the publicly available data is presented on the section of the sample 
description below. 
For purposes of including the characteristics of corporate governance structure as a 
determinant of disclosure, and driven by agency and contingency theories, we defined a 
variable for the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors of the 
companies.  
In Portugal, the regulation of corporate governance practices and disclosure is under the 
responsibility of the Portuguese securities market regulator (CMVM). In 1999, CMVM 
approved the first “Recommendations on Corporate Governance”. These comprised a set of 
non-mandatory rules that should be accomplished by companies. Regarding managing boards, 
it is encouraged that (CMVM (1999), Recommendation nº15) “the board of directors should 
be comprised in such a way as to ensure that the management of the company is not only 
geared towards the protection of the interests of majority stakeholders. It is therefore 
recommended that independent members exercise significant influence on collective decision-
making and that they contribute to the development of the strategies of the company, thereby 
acting in the interests of the company as a whole.”. This set of Recommendations however 
did not produce fair disclosures for investors. This was recognized by CMVM itself, which 
published a first mandatory set of rules – Regulation nº 7/2001 (CMVM (2001a)). In the 
Introduction to this Regulation, CMVM recognizes that the disclosure of the extent to which 
the Recommendations on Corporate Governance were observed is being complied 
increasingly by companies, but “…it is not unusual to find that disclosure is uneven and 
insufficient”. Regulation Nº 07/2001 obliges listed companies to disclose annual information 
on various aspects of corporate governance in an appendix or chapter of their annual 
management report. This is the reason why the construction of our variable of percentage of 
independent directors is based on the corporate governance reports (or chapters of the annual 
reports) of the year 2002. The variable obtained is not exempted from limitations. In fact, as 
seen by the definition of independent director presented above, this is a concept defined by 
each company. This means that we register what companies disclose in their reports as 
independent directors in the board. Once there was not a definition of independence imposed 
  18by law and applied to every company, there could be differences in the definition among 
companies
8. 
Besides the proportion of independent directors in the total directors of the board, we define 
two alternative measures for corporate governance characteristics of Portuguese companies. A 
first measure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company complies with 
Recommendation 9 (CMVM (2001b)) and zero, otherwise. This recommendation encourages 
the inclusion in the board of one or more independent directors regarding major shareholders 
and that the company defines clearly the concept of independence. The other proxy is the 
percentage of compliance with all the CMVM’s “Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance” (CMVM (2001b)). These two measures are based on the answers by listed 
companies to the 4
th survey on the practices regarding corporate governance produced by 
CMVM (CMVM (2002)). 
Next table sums up the hypotheses, the proxies for measuring the independent variables and 
the predicted relationship with the dependent variable. 
                                                 
8 CMVM felt, afterwards, the need for defining a clear and objective concept for independent director and in its 
Regulation nº 11/2003 (CMVM (2003b)), article 1, it defines that “administrators associated with specific 
interest groups in the company shall not be considered independent officers, namely: 
a) Members of the board of directors who are also members of the board of directors of the controlling company, 
as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code; 
b) Members of the board of directors who are holders of qualified holdings in an amount equal to or larger than 
10% of the share capital or of the voting rights in the company, or an identical percentage in a controlling 
company, as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code; 
c) Members of the board of directors who hold management position or have contractual ties with a competing 
company; 
d) Members of the board of directors who receive compensation from the company, or from any parent company 
or affiliates within the same group other than in the form of compensation for their role as corporate officers; 
e) Members of the board of directors who are spouses, family or direct kin through third lineage, including those 
persons referred to in the paragraphs above. 
3 – In addition to checking the circumstances described above, the board must ensure, in a well founded manner, 
the independence of the directors in light of other pertinent circumstances.”. 
  19Table 2: Hypotheses, variables’ proxies and expected relationship 
Hypothesis Variables 
proxies 
 Expected  relationship 
Firm-specific variables 
Size  Total assets  Tassets  Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
 Natural  log 
of total assets 
Lassets 
 
Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
  Total sales  Tsales  Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
 Natural  log 
of total sales 
Lsales  Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
Industry 1  dummy 
variable 
ind1: Financial (1 = yes; 0 = 
no) 
No prediction 
Auditor type  1 dummy 
variable 
d_aud: Big 5 / Non Big 5 (1 = 
yes; 0 = no) 
Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
Listing status  1 dummy 
variable  
 
d_list: Country of 
origin/Foreign country (listed 
on one foreign stock exchange 
or multilisting) (1= yes; 0=no) 
Negative association with the 
disclosure degree 
Multinationality Sales  foreign 
countries/ 
Total sales 
Mult  Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
Capital (Finance) Structure: 
Shareholders/ 
creditors 
Debt/Equity DE  No  prediction 
     Ownership diffusion 





by the top 
five 
shareholders 





MV  Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 
Corporate governance: 
Board composition  Proportion of 
independent 
directors  









D_ind_dir: 1 =complies; 0 = 
does not comply 
Positive association with the 
disclosure degree 















  20Sample selection and characteristics  
Our sample is based on the companies listed on Euronext Lisbon on the 31
st December 2001
9. 
At the end of 2001, there were 56 quoted companies in Portugal. One company did not 
publish an annual report in 2001 and so it was excluded from the analysis. Hence, the final 
sample is comprised of 55 companies, of which 29% are from the industrial sector and 20% 
from the financial sector. Appendix II contains a list of the sample companies and respective 
economic sector.  
Table 3: Sample sectoral distribution 
Economic sector  N 
Basic materials  7  12.7%
Consumer, cyclical  9  16.4%
Consumer, non-cyclical  4  7.3%
Financial 11  20.0%
Industrial 16  29.1%
Technology 4  7.3%
Telecommunications 3  5.5%
Utilities 1  1.8%
Total 55 100.0%
In terms of listing type, the big majority of companies (90%) is quoted in the Portuguese 
stock exchange exclusively. Additionally, there are five companies that are cross-listed in the 
USA.  Regarding the auditor company, the majority (76%) is audited by a big five company. 
The source for companies’ listings and auditor company data is the companies’ annual reports 
complemented by the companies’ websites. 
 
 Table 4: Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation
Total Assets  55  22.05 358137.51 10833.29 48944.85
Total Sales  55  5.80 34885.49 1720.26 4890.21
Sales foreign countries/Total sales  55  .00 93.46 24.55 29.64
Total liabilities  55  37.91 96.33 72.55 15.06
Panel B: Dummy variables 
   N  % 
Listing status  Listed, origin country stock exchange  50 90.91% 
  Listed, (one) foreign stock exchange  00 . 0 0 %  
  Multilisting, including USA  59 . 0 9 %  
  Multilisting, not-including USA  00 . 0 0 %  
Auditor status  Big five  42 76.36% 
  Non Big five  13 23.64% 
 
                                                 
9 We chose the year 2001 because it is the year that IAS 39 became effective and it is the last year for which 
annual reports had been published when we started the research. 
  21Regarding capital structure, we analyze companies’ debt to equity ratio, market capitalization 
to total assets ratio and ownership diffusion. The source for the two first variables is the 
annual reports and, for the ownership diffusion variable, a public database provided by 
Euronext Lisbon (CR –ROM of quoted companies for the year 2000).  
 
Table 5: Capital structure of Portuguese companies 
Panel A: Leverage and Importance of equity 
 N  Min  Max  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Liabilities /Equity (D/E) (%)  55 61.07 2628.39 492.92 550.53 
Market value /Assets (%)  55 3.36 219.49 37.12 39.95 
Panel B: Ownership diffusion – percentage of shares held by top shareholders 
 N  Average  Max  Min  St.  dev. 
Top five shareholders  27  59.33%  95.65%  18.09%  0.220484 
Top four shareholders  7  64.98%  96.68%  25.89%  0.213024 
Top three shareholders  6  75.41%  91.90%  55.91%  0.124249 
Top two shareholders  10  70.82%  99.20%  42.94%  0.167491 
 
Regarding corporate governance variables, we computed the percentage of independent 
directors within the board of directors, based on the 2002 corporate governance reports 
published by companies. When companies did not disclose this information, all directors were 
classified as non-independent. This procedure may create a bias but it is considered preferable 
to the alternative procedure of eliminating the observations.  
Analysing the proportion of independent directors as referred by each company (Table 6, 
panel A), we conclude that in almost 50% of companies, less than a half of the directors are 
independent. Almost 30% of companies claim to have between 90 to 100% of independent 
directors in their Board. As referred above, in the year 2002, the definition of independence 
was not set forth by any regulation; it was the company that defined what it considered to be 
independent directors and the disclosure was based on this self-constructed concept of 
independence. This means that it might have happened that companies considered as 
independent, directors that in fact were not, in the light of the subsequent regulations on 
corporate governance. We, in fact, are convinced that this is not merely a possibility. CMVM 
itself found that the situation regarding independence of directors should be changed and 
regulated. As a consequence, CMVM decided subsequently to include definitions of 
  22independence and specifically defined who cannot be considered an independent director 
(Regulation nº 11/2003 (CMVM (2003) and Regulation nº 10/2005 (CMVM (2005)).  
Indeed, in the CMVM 4th Survey of the Corporate Governance Practices (CMVM (2002)), 
par.3.9, it can be read that “this recommendation (the existence of one or more independent 
directors) is the one with lower degree of compliance… this is due, mainly, to the fact that it 
has been introduced an additional question associated with this recommendation – the 
existence of a clear definition of independence in the company. In fact, if this question was 
not included, 80,4% of the companies would comply with this recommendation…”
10. Thus, 
the results for this variable cannot be interpreted without caution. 
Trying to go a deep further on the analysis of the corporate governance structure of 
Portuguese companies and in order to mitigate the disadvantages of the previous measure, we 
consider additional measures based on alternative sources of information. We use two 
additional proxies for the structure of Portuguese companies’ corporate governance. The first 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company complies with CMVM’s 
recommendation regarding the existence of at least one independent director and the existence 
of a definition of independence. The source for this variable is CMVM and data for the 
variable are obtained through a survey to quoted companies. The second is a continuous 
variable that measures the degree of compliance with the overall recommendations on 
corporate governance, as published in CMVM 4
th survey on corporate governance practices 
(CMVM (2002)).  
Analyzing compliance with Recommendations on Corporate governance, we conclude that 
Portuguese companies have still a big way to go through as regards to good practices on 
corporate governance. Regarding the recommendation related to independent directors (Table 
6, panel B), which includes both the need of having at least one independent director on the 
Board and the existence of a definition of independence, the majority of companies (53%) do 
not comply with it. Analyzing the average degree of compliance with all recommendations 
(Table 6, panel C), it is slightly above 50%, meaning that in average almost half of the 
recommendations are not complied by Portuguese companies. Individually considered, we 
conclude that no company complies with all recommendations (the maximum value for the 
compliance degree is 92%). 
 
                                                 
10 Authors’ translation. 
  23Table 6: Corporate governance 
Panel A: Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Proportion of 
independent directors  N  % 
Accumulated 
Distribution 
>=90 e <=100  15  27.27%  100.00% 
>=80 e <90  1  1.82%  72.73% 
>=70 e <80  1  1.82%  70.91% 
>=60 e <70  6  10.91%  69.09% 
>=50 e <60  4  7.27%  58.18% 
>=40 e <50  4  7.27%  50.91% 
>=30 e <40  3  5.45%  43.64% 
>=20 e <30  4  7.27%  38.18% 
>=10 e <20  4  7.27%  30.91% 
<10% 13  23.64%  23.64% 
 55  100%   
Panel B: Degree of compliance with the CMVM’s Recommendations  




Yes  22 (46.81%) 
No  25 (53.19%) 
Total  47 
Source: Data granted by CMVM 




Max  92.30% 
Min  18.20% 
Average  57.13% 
St. Dev  18.40% 
Total obs  47 
Source: CMVM (2002) 
 
VI. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics       
Table 7 reports the overall means and standard deviations for the dependent variable – the 
adjusted disclosure index (Idisc_a) and for each of its categories. The range of scores for the 
disclosure index varied from 16% to 64% with a mean of 44%. The category for which we 
registered highest disclosure degree is “Accounting policies”. The disclosure degree within 
this category, which comprises the disclosure of the accounting policies for each class of 
financial instruments, shows a mean of 80% among all companies. On the opposite side, the 
categories that show lowest levels of disclosure are “Fair and market values” and “Credit 
risk”. The first includes the disclosure of measurement method and significant assumptions. 
  24The average disclosure degree within this category is only about 5%. The category for credit 
risk comprises the disclosure of the main counterparties, maximum amount of credit risk 
exposure and significant concentration of credit risk. This category shows an average 
disclosure degree of 6%. 
Table 7: Dependent variable 
  Minimum  Maximum Mean  Std Deviation 
Disclosure index  0.16  0.641  0.44  0.09 
Categories         
(1) Accounting policies  .000 1.000 .804 .120 
(2) Fair values and market 
values  .000 .500 .054 .129 
(3) Securitisation  .400 .800 .600 .126 
(4) Derivatives – Accounting 
policies  .000 1.000 .590 .334 
(5) Derivatives – Risks  .000 1.000 .535 .323 
(6) Derivatives - Hedging  .000 1.000 .401 .250 
(7) Derivatives – Fair value  .000 .500 .171 .221 
(8) Interest rate risk  .000 1.000 .345 .270 
(9) Credit risk  .000 1.000 .067 .207 
(10) Collateral  .000 1.000 .491 .402 
(11) Other  .000 1.000 .494 .101 
 
Next table shows the mean of the index of disclosure by economic sector, by type of auditor 
and by listing status. Companies from the technology sector show the highest level of 
disclosure and, as expected, in average cross-listed companies and companies audited by the 
big five group show higher levels of disclosure. 
 
Table 8: Dependent variable means by economic sector, auditor type and listing status 
  Disclosure index 
Economic sector  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Basic materials  .435  .038
Consumer, cyclical  .422  .071
Consumer, non-
cyclical  .465  .101
Financial  .446  .156
Industrial  .440  .081
Technology  .471  .048
Telecommunications  .394  .071  
  Disclosure index 
Auditor Type  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Non- big five auditor  .399  .085
Big five auditor  .451  .091
Listing Status     
One or more foreign 
stock exchange  .537  .056
Portuguese stock 
exchange  .429  .089
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Simple regressions 
OLS simple regressions were estimated to check for univariate relationships between the 
disclosure index and each explicative variable. The results obtained are shown in Table 9. For 
each explanatory variable, regression coefficients and t-statistics are reported. When there is a 
hypothesized direction for a variable one-tailed t-test is applied, otherwise two-tailed tests are 
used. In every regression, we analyze the presence of heteroscedasticity with the White’s 
general test (White (1980)). When this test indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity, the 
White’s heteroscedasticity consistent variances and standard errors were used.  
 
Table 9: OLS simple regressions  
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, when necessary) 
Hypothesis Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic 
H1 Tassets  4.61E-07  4.100543* 
 Lassets  0.012256  1.731635** 
 Tsales  5.09E-06  2.050536** 
 Lsales  0.015320  2.288001** 
H2 Ind1  0.008909  0.285146 
H3 D_aud  0.052654  1.845112** 
H4 D_list  -0.107740  -2.633464* 
H5 Mult  0.000274  0.647 
H6 Tliab  0.000648  0.777255 
 Fliab  1,093E-04  0.157 
 DE  0.003690  1.010319 
H7 MV  -.000196  -.622468 
H8 Ind_dir  0.023527  0.724669 
 D_ind_dir(a)  0.036396  1.316085 
 Corp_gov(a)  0.082069  1.51533 
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, when necessary 
* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%. One-tailed tests. 
 (a) these equations are estimated with the number of observations available for these variables (47 observations) 
 
Three hypotheses are statistically validated. The first is H1 which relates the company size to 
disclosure level. All measures of size are statistically significant and the sign of the 
coefficient is positive as predicted. There is also a significant relationship between being 
audited by a big-five company and the level of disclosure, confirming H3. Being listed in 
more than one stock exchange (cross-listing) influences the level of disclosure as predicted by 
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with multilisting status. Being a financial or a non-financial company is not related to the 
level of disclosures. Additionally, the degree of multinationality does not relate to disclosure. 
None of the variables related to capital structure proves to be related to disclosure. Moreover, 
in spite of the expectations, the variables adopted for the corporate governance structure, 
individually considered, do not show a statistically significant relationship with disclosure. 
Now, we proceed to the multivariate analysis in order to test all hypotheses together. 
 
Multiple regressions 
Within multiple analysis, which jointly tests hypotheses formulated above, we enter all 
independent variables at once in the models. The different measures for size are highly 
correlated (the correlations between variables are shown on the Appendix III), which means 
that they cannot be included at once in the model. In order to circumvent this problem, we 
used the same procedure as Cooke (1989). We run a regression for each measure of size (total 
assets, total sales, the natural logarithm of assets and the natural logarithm of sales)
11. 
Regarding corporate governance variables, initially we included the proportion of 
independent directors. In a second stage, the proportion of independent directors was 
substituted for an alternative measure using a dummy variable. Finally, we tested another 
alternative measure for corporate governance - the degree of compliance with all CMVM’s 
recommendations.  
Some literature on determinants of disclosure indices points out a non-linear relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables (Parviainen et al. (2001) and Cooke 
(1998)). In prior empirical studies, researchers have often performed transformations to the 
variables in order to allow for non-linear relationships (Lang and Lundholm (1993), Wallace 
et al. (1994), Ali et al. (2004), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), 
Hodgdon (2004)). According to this past evidence, we test several alternative functional 
forms for the relationship between the disclosure level and the independent variables. The 
logarithmic transformation is commonly applied in empirical research to address alternative 
functional forms between the dependent and the independent variables. Accordingly, we 
performed the logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable (log-lin) and estimate 
                                                 
11 In related literature, we found other alternative procedures such as select the most relevant measure based on 
their explanatory power in univariate analysis (Dumontier and Raffournier (1998)) or in a pre-run stepwise 
regression (Giner (1997), Street and Bryant (2000), Raffournier (1995)) or, still, create a composite variable 
using factor analysis (Dumontier and Raffournier (1998)). 
  27these alternative models. Additionally, quadratic terms of some independent variables are 
included in the regressions to test for alternative functional form specifications and to capture 
decreasing or increasing marginal effects (Hodgdon (2004)). The estimation of these models 
(not reported) does not evidence improvements compared with linear results. On the contrary, 
we obtain lower R
2s and the models show problems in their overall significance (F-statistic).  
The estimation results for the linear models with total assets as proxy for size are reported in 
the Table 10
12. Four independent variables proved to be statistically significant: total assets, 
economic sector, auditor type and listing status. 
  Hypothesis 1, which states that size is positively related with levels of disclosure, is 
supported by the results. This finding is consistent with Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) who 
also find a statistically positive relationship between size and financial instruments’ 
disclosures. However, this result is inconsistent with studies that analyze compliance with 
disclosure requirements of several IAS at a time, which found no significance for company 
size (Hodgdon (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Street and Gray (2001), Street and Bryant 
(2000) and Tower et al. (1999)). 
We find support for Hypothesis 2, which states that the disclosure level is related to the type 
of industry. Our results show that belonging to financial sector is negatively related to the 
disclosure level. This result is consistent with the study of Karim and Ahmed (2005) which 
also tests the effect of financial/non –financial sector on disclosure compliance with IAS. 
Other studies do not follow this classification. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) separate mining 
and oil companies from the others. Several studies separate manufacturing from non-
manufacturing industries (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Street and Bryant (2000)) 
and others use more than two industry classes.  
Hypothesis 3, which states that disclosure degree is higher for companies audited by the 
denominated group of the Big five is also supported. This finding is consistent with Hodgdon 
(2004), Glaum and Street (2003) and Street and Gray (2001) who find positive significant 
relationship between IAS compliance and type of auditor. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) and 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) find mixed results regarding this variable. 
The coefficient of listing status is statistically significant in all models, providing support for 
Hypothesis 4, which states that the degree of disclosure is higher in companies listed on 
                                                 
12 After an analysis of the alternative models adequacy, based in broad features of the estimation results, such as 
the  R
2 value, the estimated t ratios and the signs of the estimated coefficients in relation to their prior 
expectations, models with tassets (reported in table 10) show better results than the others (not reported). 
  28foreign exchanges than in companies listed on only one (its national) stock exchange. This 
finding is widely evidenced in literature on compliance with disclosure requirements of IAS, 
namely in Hodgdon (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), 
Street and Gray (2001) and Street and Bryant (2000). 
Hypothesis 5, which states that the degree of disclosure is higher in more internationalized 
companies, is not supported by our models. This finding is consistent with Street and Gray 
(2001) who find that the degree of multinationality is not a significant determinant of the 
extent of compliance with IAS required disclosures. 
The results do not show significant influence of capital structure on disclosure. Hypothesis 6 
(degree of leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio) is not supported. Previous studies 
on compliance with IAS do not find statistically significant relationships either, except the 
study of Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) who find, in some cases, a significant and 
negative relationship. Regarding equity financing, the importance of shareholders, measured 
by the ratio of market capitalization and total assets, does not prove to be a significant 
determinant of disclosure, either. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) find mixed results for 
this factor – no significance for non-familiar IAS and significance for familiar IAS. 
In spite of expectations, our data do not show evidence on the influence of corporate 
governance on disclosure by Portuguese companies. Neither the proportion of independent 
directors, nor the degree of compliance with the overall corporate governance 
recommendations of CMVM show to be related to disclosure. The other alternative measure 
for the importance of independent directors obtained from the survey conducted by CMVM 
does not show improvements in the results, either. 
In sum, our results support Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4, that is we find size, belonging to the 
financial sector, auditor type and listing status effects on the degree of financial instruments 
related disclosure by companies.  The results do not support the influence of the 
internationality degree (H5), of the capital structure (H6 and H7) and of the corporate 
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IND_DIR  -0.004799 
(-0.168400)    
D_IND_DIR   0.013069 
(0.469624)   
CORP_GOV    -0.069853 
(-0.830426) 
Included obs  55  47  47 
Adj R2  0.10537  0.126359  0.135941 
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%. One-tailed tests. 
++ significant at 10%. Two-tailed tests. 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Portuguese Accounting Directive 18 (CNC (1996)) establishes compliance with IAS 
whenever Portuguese standards are not available. There is lack of accounting standards for 
financial instruments, namely regarding derivatives, in Portugal. Consequently, it may be 
expected that companies have been adopting IAS requirements in their accounting for 
financial instruments. Bearing in mind the mandatory adoption of IAS after 2005, it is 
interesting to analyze the characteristics of the companies that were already anticipating IAS 
requirements especially with respect to financial instruments’ disclosure items before 2005. In 
order to attain this objective, we construct an index of disclosure issues, which comprises 54 
items relating to financial instruments. The components of the index are based on IAS 32 and 
IAS 39 disclosures.  
Besides the determinants factors derived from the agency, the political costs and the 
signalling theories, we introduce the analysis of capital finance structure and corporate 
governance features of Portuguese companies within the context of contingency theory. 
  30Portuguese companies have typically high degree of family ownership and bank-oriented 
financing policies. Additionally, corporate governance practices only recently (in 2001 the 
first Recommendations - non mandatory - on corporate governance were published by 
CMVM) have been regulated and this regulation has been changing almost every year, in 
order to attain better practices of corporate governance. 
In spite of several difficulties with data availability and consistency among companies, we 
conduct the analysis and conclude that disclosure degree is significantly related to size, type 
of auditor, listing status and to the economic sector (financial/non-financial). Once the 
disclosure index is based on IAS 32 and IAS 39 disclosure requirements, the results also show 
that larger companies, companies listed on more than one exchange market and audited by 
international auditing companies are closer to the IAS requirements. Against initial 
expectations, we cannot prove the influence of corporate governance practices, including the 
board composition on the amount of disclosure among Portuguese companies. Similarly, the 
results do not show a significant influence of the type of capital financing structure. In fact 
our measures of leverage degree and of importance of capital market’s financing do not show 
statistically significant relations with disclosure level. These results, however, cannot be 
interpreted without caution. In fact, as we described above, we found difficulties on data 
availability regarding the structure of shareholders which did not allow us to proceed with a 
deep analysis of the effect of family ownership in disclosure practices. Moreover, within 
corporate governance characteristics, we also found several inconsistencies on disclosure by 
companies, namely regarding the definition of independent director. The fact that, till 2003, 
there was not a clear definition of independence by the Portuguese capital markets regulator, 
conducted to a situation in which companies could disclose a number of independent directors 
that in fact are not independent at the light of current regulation. Our measures for the 
proportion of independent directors do not show significant relations with disclosure level. 
This research brings important insights on the characteristics of Portuguese companies, its 
corporate governance and capital ownership structures, and on the reporting practices within 
the context of capital markets oriented accounting standards and much more demanding in 
terms of disclosure requirements. As such, from this research, it emerged several areas for 
improvement and that call for the intervention of the Portuguese capital markets regulator.  
Regarding corporate governance, the Portuguese capital markets regulator has been 
introducing several improvements on the regulation of the issue. Additionally, CMVM has 
been publishing studies on the compliance degree with corporate governance 
  31recommendations/regulations every year, disclosing the name of companies that comply or 
not. These procedures are bringing improvements on corporate governance practices.  
Regarding the adoption of IAS, there is not an enforcement program in action in Portugal. 
The supervision of listed companies financial reporting is of the responsibility of CMVM. 
This function assumes much more importance within the context of mandatory adoption of 
IAS. In fact, the change to IAS means a complete change in the attitude toward financial 
reporting. We show that, before 2005, many companies were not applying IAS 32 and IAS 39 
as supplementary accounting standards, not complying with the Portuguese accounting 
directive 18. This is an indicator that there will be several problems of compliance with 
IAS/IFRS after 2005. Effective enforcement mechanisms are urgent. CMVM has been 
publishing the name of companies that have certified auditor’s reports. This is an initial step, 
but it is not enough within the enforcement of IAS. Similarly to what is done with corporate 
governance practices, the market supervisor must develop analyzes of compliance with IAS 
based on annual reports published by companies and implement actions towards non-
complying companies. 
Finally, we would like to address some limitations inherent to this study.  First, there is the 
problem of the sample size. This problem, which is intrinsic to Portuguese capital market size, 
restricts our hypotheses testing by means of linear regression models. Another limitation 
results from the index construction process. We were very careful with the scoring process, 
but errors may have occurred. Furthermore, annual reports are not the only means by which 
companies disclose financial instruments. But, with no doubt, they are the most important 
one. Lastly, this study covers the annual reports for a single year, before IAS/IFRS are 
mandatory. Additional research that includes other years, namely after 2005, will allow 
interesting analyzes of evolution of disclosure practices and compliance by companies within 
new accounting frameworks. In spite of these limitations, we are convinced that this research 
revealed very interesting relations of the disclosure practices and several characteristics of 
Portuguese companies, showing the applicability of relevant theoretical frameworks in 
contexts not studied before. 
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Appendix I–Components of the disclosure index 
Disclosure Index    
  Score (if disclosed)
Accounting Policies   
Held for trading securities  1 
Held-to-maturity securities  1 
Loans and receivables originated by the enterprise  1 
Available-for-sale financial assets  1 
Held-for-trading liabilities   1 
Other financial liabilities  1 
Trade date vs Settlement date  1 
Fair values and market values   
Measurement method  1 
Significant assumptions  1 
Fair value changes in Available-for-sale financial assets  1 
Amount recognised in equity   1 
Amount removed from equity  1 
Unability of reliability in measurement   
Financial assets description  1 
Their carrying amount  1 
Explanation of the reason  1 
Range of estimates within which the fair value is likely to lie  1 
Securitisation and repurchase agreements   
Accounting policy  1 
Nature and extent  1 
Collateral 1 
Whether the financial assets have been derecognised  1 
Information about the key assumptions used in calculating the fair 
value of new and retained interests  1 
Derivatives – Accounting policies   
Risk management policy, including hedging policy  1 
Objectives of holding or issuing derivatives  1 
Accounting policies and methods adopted  1 
Monitoring and controlling policy  1 
Financial controls  1 
Derivatives – Risks   
  33Segregation by risk categories  1 
Principal, stated value, face value, notional value  1 
Maturity 1 
Weighted average/effective interest rate  1 
Derivatives – Hedging   
Hedging description  1 
Accounting method  1 
Financial instruments designated as hedging instruments  1 
Fair values  1 
Nature of the risks being hedged  1 
Future transactions hedging   
The period in which forecasted transactions are expected to occur  1 
The period they are expected to enter in income  1 
Cash-flow hedging   
The amount recognised in equity  1 
The amount removed from equity and recognised in income  1 
The amount removed from equity and added to initial 
measurement of the acquisition cost  1 
Derivatives – Fair value   
Fair value  1 
Method adopted  1 
Significant assumptions  1 
Average fair value during the year  1 
Interest rate risk   
Future changes in interest rates  1 
Maturity dates  1 
Credit risk   
Counterparties identification  1 
Maximum amount of credit risk exposure  1 
Significant concentration of credit risk  1 
Collateral  
Terms and conditions  1 
Carrying amount and fair value  1 
Other   
Impairment losses  1 
Total interest income and total interest expense (separately)  1 
In AFS, realized and unrealized gains/losses (separately)  1 
Total Score 54 
  34 Appendix II – Sample companies in alphabetic order 
Company Name  Economic Sector  Company Name  Economic Sector 
Barbosa & Almeida  Industrial  ITI   Consumer, cyclical 
BANIF  Financial  Jerónimo Martins  Consumer, non-cyclical 
BCA Financial  LISGRAFICA  Consumer,  cyclical 
BCP Financial  Mota-Engil  Industrial 
BES Financial  Mundicenter  Financial 
BPI Financial  NOVABASE  Technology 
BRISA Industrial  Soc. Comercial Orey 
Antunes 
Industrial 
BSCH Financial  Papelaria  Fernandes  Consumer,  cyclical 
Banco Totta & Açores  Financial  PARAREDE  Technology 
Corticeira Amorim  Industrial  PORTUCEL Produtora de 
Pasta e Papel 
Basic materials 
Companhia de Celulose do 
Caima 
Industrial  PT Multimédia  Consumer, cyclical 
CENTRAL - Banco de 
Investimento 
Financial REDITUS  Technology 
CIMPOR   Industrial  Salvador Caetano  Industrial 
CIN Basic  materials  Soares  da  Costa  Industrial 
CIRES Basic  materials  SAG  GEST   Consumer, cyclical 
COFINA Basic  materials  SEMAPA    Industrial 
COMPTA   Technology  SOMAGUE   Industrial 
Modelo Continente  Consumer, non-cyclical  SONAE Indústria  Industrial 
EDP  Utilities  SONAE SGPS  Consumer, non-cyclical 
EFACEC Industrial  SONAE.COM Telecommunications 
Estoril - Sol  Consumer, cyclical  SUMOLIS   Consumer, non-cyclical 
F.Ramada Basic  materials  Teixeira  Duarte  Industrial 
FINIBANCO Financial  Portugal  Telecom  Telecommunications 
FISIPE Basic  materials  TERTIR  Industrial 
Grão-Pará Industrial  Vista  Alegre Atlantis  Consumer, cyclical 
IBERSOL  Consumer, cyclical  Vodafone Telecel   Telecommunications 
IMOLEASING Financial     
IMPRESA Consumer, cyclical     
INAPA Basic  materials     
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ov  Idisc_a 
T a s   s e t s . 0 0 0 1               
Lassets  0.558  1.000             
Tsales  0.966  0.650  1.000            
Lsales  0.473  0.896  0.612  1.000           
Ind1 0.421  0.560  0.372  0.297  1.000          
D_aud  0.096  0.349  0.144  0.407  0.121  1.000         
D_list  -0.551 -0.601 -0.578 -0.521 -0.358  -0.179  1.000        
Mult  0.168 0.048 0.192 0.164  -0.182 0.091  -0.084 1.000             
De  0.286 0.624 0.275 0.422 0.851 0.109  -0.279  -0.170 1.000           
Mv  -0.130 -0.214 -0.119 -0.073 -0.306  0.211  0.019  -0.129  -0.372  1.000     
Ind_dir  -0.002 0.311 0.076 0.246 0.161 0.307  -0.241 0.186 0.061  -0.148 1.000       
D_ind_dir 0.185 0.148 0.135 0.075 0.302 0.175  -0.230  -0.055 0.272  -0.189 0.106 1.000     
Corp_gov 0.352 0.559 0.408 0.563 0.261 0.410  -0.479 0.094 0.227 0.036 0.159 0.330 1.000   
Idisc_a  0.251 0.281 0.271 0.273 0.118 0.267  -0.350 0.010 0.237  -0.108 0.071 0.195 0.161 1.000 
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